Recovering Photos From Bad Storage Cards

A Guide for Photogaphers, Not Geeks

Most photographers have had at least one heart attack moment when they realize all of the photos they’ve taken on a shoot (or a vacation) are suddenly gone, and there’s nothing on the camera’s storage card. Perhaps you’ve accidentally formatted the wrong card, or the card just somehow got damaged. If you’re a professional photographer, there’s a good chance your’e also not a forensic scientist or a hard-core nerd (although it’s OK to be all three!). That minor detail doesn’t mean, however, that you can’t learn to carve data off of a bad storage card and save yourself a lot of money on data recovery. While there are many aspects to forensic science that are extremely complicated, data carving isn’t one of them, and I’ll even walk you through how to do it on your Mac in this article, with a little bit of open source software and a few commands. If you’re scared of your computer, don’t worry. This is all very easy even though it looks a bit intimidating at first. You can test your skills using any old storage card you might have on hand. It doesn’t have to be damaged, although you might be surprised just how much data you thought was deleted from it!

First, lets talk about how your storage card works. When you plug your storage card into your computer, your computer looks for a list of files on the card; this is kind of like a rolodex of all the files your camera has stored. This “catalog” basically says, “OK, this file is this big, and it starts here”. You can think of it like the table of contents of a book. When you format a storage card, most of the time it’s just this table of contents that gets deleted; the actual bits and bytes from the photo you took aren’t erased (because that would take too long). The same can be true when the file system becomes damaged; in most cases, it’s just the file listing that gets blown up somehow, making it appear like there are no files on the card. In more extreme cases, physical damage can sometimes damage the data from one part of the card, but the data for the other half of the card can still be recovered; your computer needs to be told to look past all the damaged data, instead of just giving you an error message.

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Journal Paper Published

The International Journal of Digital Forensics and Incident Response has formally accepted and published my paper titled Identifying Back Doors, Attack Points, and Surveillance Mechanisms in iOS Devices. This paper is a compendium of services and mechanisms used by many law enforcement agencies and in open source, of modern forensic techniques to create a forensic copy of personal data from iOS devices. It also covers existing mechanisms designed for enterprises, such as fingerprint and PIN bypasses, which could potentially be misappropriated for surveillance of a target, if provided with the right technical capabilities.

Note: I don’t make any money off of this paper; the journal itself charges for copies of all of its papers, but unless they haven’t told me something, the author doesn’t make any commission. I wrote this strictly for the endeavor of science and knowledge.

Forensics Tools: Stop Miscalculating iOS Usage Analytics!

There are some great forensics tools out there… and also some really crummy ones. I’ve found an incredible amount of wrong information in the often 500+ page reports some of these tools crank out, and often times the accuracy of the data is critical to one of the cases I’m assisting with at the time. Tools validation is critical to the healthy development cycle of a forensics tool, and unfortunately many companies don’t do enough of it. If investigators aren’t doing their homework to validate the information (and subsequently provide feedback to the software manufacturer), the consequences could mean an innocent person goes to jail, or a guilty one goes free. No joke. This could have happened a number of times had I not caught certain details.

Today’s reporting fail is with regards to the application “usage” information stored in iOS in the ADDataStore.sqlitedb file. At least a couple forensics tools are misreporting this data so as to be up to 26 hours or more off.
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Fingerprint Reader / PIN Bypass for Enterprises Built Into iOS 7

With iOS 7 and the new 5s come a few new security mechanisms, including a snazzy fingerprint reader and a built-in “trust” mechanism to help prevent juice jacking. Most people aren’t aware, however, that with so much new consumer security also come new bypasses in order to give enterprises access to corporate devices. These are in your phone’s firmware, whether it’s company owned or not, and their security mechanisms are likely also within the reach of others, such as government agencies or malicious hackers. One particular bypass appears to bypass both the passcode lock screen as well as the fingerprint locking mechanism, to grant enterprises access to their devices while locked. But at what cost to the overall security of consumer devices?

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How Juice Jacking Works, and Why It’s a Threat

How ironic that only a week or two after writing an article about pair locking,  we would see this talk coming out of Black Hat 2013, demonstrating how juice jacking can be used to install malicious software. The talk is getting a lot of buzz with the media, but many security guys like myself are scratching our heads wondering why this is being considered “new” news. Granted, I can only make statements based on the abstract of the talk, but all signs seem to point to this as a regurgitation of the same type of juice jacking talks we saw at DefCon two years ago. Nevertheless, juice jacking is not only technically possible, but has been performed in the wild for a few years now. I have my own juice jacking rig, which I use for security research, and I have also retrofitted my iPad Mini with a custom forensics toolkit, capable of performing a number of similar attacks against iOS devices. Juice jacking may not be anything new, but it is definitely a serious consideration for potential high profile targets, as well as for those serious about data privacy.

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Free Download: iOS Forensic Investigative Methods

Given the vast amount of loose knowledge now out there in the community, and the increasing number of commercial tools available to conduct both law enforcement and private sector acquisition of an iOS device, I’ve decided to make my law enforcement guide, “iOS Forensic Investigative Methods” freely available to all. The manual contains a lot of useful low-level information about the iPhone and the different artifacts commonly found while performing a forensic analysis. Chapter 3 requires a set of tools to actually image the device (which are not presently available to the public), however there are a number of commercial and open source tools that can be substituted here to acquire a disk image. Anyone with a little experience should be able to figure out by now how to get a copy of their own device’s disk. There is plenty of knowledge in this manual to teach you the basics of where to find information, such as various caches and other data, on the device, and what kind of evidence to look for when conducting investigations. It may also give the informal geek a peek down the rabbit hole to see just what kind of data is stored by your device.  I decided to release this for the betterment of technical knowledge in the community, so enjoy!

PDF: iOS Forensic Investigative Methods

iOS Counter Forensics: Encrypting SMS and Other Crypto-Hardening

As I explained in a recent blog post, your iOS device isn’t as encrypted as you think. In fact, nearly everything except for your email database and keychain can (and often is) recovered by Apple under subpoena (your device is either sent to or flown to Cupertino, and a copy of its hard drive contents are provided to law enforcement). Depending on your device model, a number of existing forensic imaging tools can also be used to scrape data off of your device, some of which are pirated in the wild. Lastly, a number of jailbreak and hacking tools, and private exploits can get access to your device even if it is protected with a passcode or a PIN. The only thing protecting your data on the device is the tiny sliver of encryption that is applied to your email database and keychain. This encryption (unlike the encryption used on the rest of the file system) makes use of your PIN or passphrase to encrypt the data in such a way that it is not accessible until you first enter it upon a reboot. Because nearly every working forensics or hacking tool for iOS 6 requires a reboot in order to hijack the phone, your email database file and keychain are “reasonably” secure using this better form of encryption.

While I’ve made remarks in the past that Apple should incorporate a complex boot passphrase into their iOS full disk encryption, like they do with File Vault, it’s fallen on deaf ears, and we will just have to wait for Apple to add real security into their products. It’s also beyond me why Apple decided that your email was the only information a consumer should find “valuable” enough to encrypt. Well, since Apple doesn’t have your security in mind, I do… and I’ve put together something you can do to protect the remaining files on your device. This technique will let you turn on the same type of encryption used on your email index for other files on the device. The bad news is that you have to jailbreak your phone to do it, which reduces the overall security of the device. The good news is that the trade-off might be worth it. When you jailbreak, not only can unsigned code run on the device, but App Store applications running inside the sandbox will have access to much more personal data they previously didn’t have access to, due to certain sandbox patches that are required in order to make the jailbreak work. This makes me feel uneasy, given the amount of spyware that’s already been found in the App Store… so you’ll need to be careful what you install if you’re going to jailbreak. The upside is that , by protecting other files on your device with Data-Protection encryption, forensic recovery will be highly unlikely without knowledge of (or brute forcing) your passphrase. Files protected this way are married to your passphrase, and so even with physical possession of your device, it’s unlikely they’d be recoverable.

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Introduction to iOS Binary Patching (Part 1)

Part of my job as a forensic scientist is to hack applications. When working some high profile cases, it’s not always that simple to extract data right off of the file system; this is especially true if the data is encrypted or obfuscated in some way. In such cases, it’s sometimes easier to clone the file system of a device and perform what some would call “forensic hacking”; there are often many flaws within an application that can be exploited to convince the application to unroll its own data. We also perform a number of red-team pen-tests for financial/banking, government, and other customers working with sensitive data, where we (under contract) attack the application (and sometimes the servers) in an attempt to test the system’s overall security. More often than not, we find serious vulnerabilities in the applications we test. In the time I’ve spent doing this, I’ve seen a number of applications whose encryption implementations have been riddled with holes, allowing me to attack the implementation rather than the encryption itself (which is much harder).

There are a number of different ways to manipulate an iOS application. I wrote about some of them in my last book, Hacking and Securing iOS Applications . The most popular (and expedient) method involves using tools such as Cycript or a debugger to manipulate the Objective-C runtime, which I demonstrated in my talk at Black Hat 2012 (slides). This is very easy to do, as the entire runtime funnels through only a handful of runtime C functions. It’s quite simple to hijack an application’s program flow, create your own objects, or invoke methods within an application. Often times, tinkering with the runtime is more than enough to get what you want out of an application. The worst example of security I demonstrated in my book was one application that simply decrypted and loaded all of its data with a single call to an application’s login function, [ OneSafeAppDelegate userIsLogged: ]. Manipulating the runtime will only get you so far, though. Tools like Cycript only work well at a method level. If you’re trying to override some logic inside of a method, you’ll need to resort to a debugger. Debugging an application gives you more control, but is also an interactive process; you’ll need to repeat your process every time you want to manipulate the application (or write some fancy scripts to do it). Developers are also getting a little trickier today in implementing jailbreak detection and counter-debugging techniques, meaning you’ll have to fight through some additional layers just to get into the application.

This is where binary patching comes in handy. One of the benefits to binary patching is that the changes to the application logic can be made permanent within the binary. By changing the program code itself, you’re effectively rewriting the application. It also lets you get down to a machine instruction level and manipulate registers, arguments, comparison operations, and other granular logic. Binary patching has been used historically to break applications’ anti-piracy mechanisms, but is also quite useful in the fields of forensic research as well as penetration testing. If I can find a way to patch an application to give me access to certain evidence that it wouldn’t before, then I can copy that binary back to the original device (if necessary) to extract a copy of the evidence for a case, or provide the investigator with a device that has a permanently modified version of the application they can use for a specific purpose. For our pen-testing clients, I can provide a copy of their own modified binary, accompanied by a report demonstrating how their application was compromised, and how they can strengthen the security for what will hopefully be a more solid production release.

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Your iOS device isn’t as encrypted as you think

This should help clear up the common misconception that data is encrypted and secured in iOS. While it’s true that iOS does sport an encrypted file system, that file system is virtually always unlocked from the moment the operating system boots up, as the OS (and your applications) need access to it. Even when the device is locked with your PIN or passphrase, the encrypted file system is readable to the operating system – what this means is that your data is NOT encrypted using an encryption that depends on your password – at least for the most part. Apple adds a second layer of encryption on top of this file system called Data-Protection. Apple’s Data-Protection encryption has the ability to protect a file while the device is locked by encrypting it with a key that is only available when you’ve entered your PIN or passphrase. While a PIN can be brute forced, a passphrase is much stronger.

So what’s the problem? Well, as of even the latest versions of iOS, the only files protected with this secondary encryption is your mail index, the keychain itself, and third party application files specifically tagged (by the developer) as protected with Data-Protection. Virtually everything else (your contacts, SMS, spotlight cache, photos, and so on) remain unprotected. To demonstrate this, I’ve put together a small recipe you can run on your own jailbroken device to bypass the lock screen. You can then use the GUI to browse through all of the data on the device, without ever providing your PIN. The only thing you’ll not be able to access are the files I’ve just mentioned. This lock screen bypass isn’t really a vulnerability in and of itself; it’s just one of many ways I can demonstrate to you that you don’t need a passphrase to view a vast majority if the data on your phone.

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National Institute of Justice Validates Zdziarski Method

Rick Ayers at NIST has validated the iPhone forensics tools law enforcement have been using for a few years now. This is quite an honor, not only to know that the tools are considered sound by a government standards entity, but also that this research has been important enough to the community for it to be tested in the first place. The tools are where they are today thanks to some of the great contributions from both the law enforcement and iPhone development community. A special thanks to Joshua Hill (posixninja), who has helped to craft some of the latest injection techniques.

NIJ Special Report: Test Results for Mobile Device Acquisition Tool: Zdziarski’s Method ]

Bypassing iPhone 3G[s] Encryption

Bypassing Passcode and Backup Encryption:

Forensic Recovery of Raw Disk:

What Data Can You Steal From an iPhone in 2 Minutes?

These YouTube videos demonsrate just how easy it is to bypass the passcode and backup encryption in an iPhone 3G[s] within only a couple of minutes’ time. A second video shows how easily tools can pull an unencrypted raw disk image from the device. The seriousness of the iPhone 3G[s]’ vulnerabilities may make enterprises and government agencies think twice before allowing these devices to contain confidential data. Apple has been alerted to and aware of these vulnerabilities for many years, across all three models of iPhone, but has failed to address them.

The 3G[s] has penetrated the government/military markets as well as top fortune-100s, possibly under the misleading marketing term “hardware encryption”, which many have taken at face value. Serious vulnerabilities such as these threaten to put our country’s national security at risk. Apple’s only fix thus far has been to consistently put a few nails on the front door, but they have thus far failed to fix the major underlying design issues that allow for this threat. Unfortunately, the only way Apple seems to listen is through addressing such problems publicly, as all previous attempts to talk with them have failed. I sincerely hope they fix these issues before a breach occurs.

File Vault’s Dirty Little Secrets

File Vault is the encryption mechanism used to protect user accounts on Apple’s Mac OS X file system. While disabled by default, many people rely on file vault to protect their personal data. Many criminals, no doubt, also use file vault to encrypt content that would otherwise be incriminating. The security offered by an encrypted volume comes at a price – Apple’s closed source approach has left a significant amount of ambiguity about how the system actually works, and many erroneous assumptions have left holes for data to be recoverable. Among these misconceptions are the idea that raw data inside a vault cannot be accessed, and the erroneous belief that mechanisms such as Apple’s free space wipe will remove deleted data. This brief how-to shows you how to obtain a raw disk image from a file vault, and illustrates that deleted data can be recovered. It also shows that mechanisms like Disk Utility’s “Erase Free Space” option doesn’t affect the deleted contents inside a vault.

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